@blingring I read that, and here are my comments. TL;DR: lovely idea, but fails at the first point.
An immediate ceasefire to be followed by a rapid withdrawal of Russian troops behind the 24-2-2022 border line
This is the minimum first step required for a peace process. It’s not going to happen until Russia realises its campaign is doomed to fail. No amount of demands is going to cause Russia to withdraw. Only clear military failure (or full political/economic collapse) will do that.
The creation of a fully demilitarised zone, 200km on each side of the 24-2-2022 border line, to be monitored by means jointly agreed
Not a good idea. It would effectively leave 200km on Ukrainian side undefended. Any monitoring that falls short of actually having troops on the ground to counter an attack, will be considered too risky by Ukrainians and is likely to fail if/when Russia becomes belligerent again. All they would have to do, is to drive across the 200km on their side and hey presto, they would be in undefended Ukrainian territory.
A mutual non-aggression protocol based on the recognition that Ukraine is a sovereign, militarily neutral country that allows no nuclear weapons on its territory
They already had this in the Budapest memorandum. Russia showed no respect for it. There’s no reason at this point to assume Russia will respect the next version. This by the way, is also in keeping with a very long history of Russian foreign and military policy.
A governance structure for the Eastern and Southern areas of Ukraine based on the Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement to ensure political equality between the Russian and Ukrainian speaking communities
Seeing as the first point was withdrawal to pre-2022 borders, this must refer to Crimea and Donbas. This would have some chance of influencing the outcome, if the Russian claims of being worried about the political status of Russian speakers in these areas were made in good faith. There’s a lot of evidence suggesting that they are not, and evidence that they have considered pulling the same thing elsewhere. But sure, why not.
All parties agree to refer outstanding disputes pre-existing the 24-02-2022 invasion to UN facilitated negotiations
As far as I know, there’s exactly one case of a serious territorial dispute succesfully and permanently being solved by UN or it’s predecessor. That was the dispute Finland and Sweden had over the Åland islands. And that only worked because both nations were oriented towards international co-operation and peaceful solutions, and they were already friendly with each other so they had every reason to expect the other side to honour the agreement as well.
But fundamentally, the whole thing falls down already at the first point. As long as Russia has any reason to think they might at the very least be able to grind the war into a stalemate that neither side has the power to break, they have no reason to withdraw. If they think they can solidify their control over the territories, or even capture more land, that’s even more the case.
I’m sure Ukraine would absolutely welcome an immediate withdrawal of Russian troops behind the 2022 borders. That might even go some way to mitigating what now must be phenomenal distrust of Russian foreign politics on their part. But I don’t see that being on the cards, and I don’t think Ukraine does either.