@SteveBellovin@jpgoldberg@feld@cendyne@drwho That's unrelated to QC though, and I think it should have got fixed immediately after Snowden revelations (spoilers: It's not fixed at all) with things like PFS and easy key-rotation. Sadly it not.
Mostly I feel that it is too early to be standardizing PQC. The process has helped discover problems, with SIKE for example, and so is good thing. But I don’t think we are ready to codify winners.
We really do have time. Work on PQC remains well ahead of any cryptographically relevant QC.
Recorded traffic is always an issue when it comes to cryptography, and the lack of those mitigations means it's very easy to break a key before it's changed, or typically never changed at all in cases like cryptographic identities.
@lanodan@jpgoldberg@feld@cendyne@drwho It absolutely is related. Assume something like signed Diffie-Hellman to establish a session key. DH, including ECDH, can be cracked by a quantum computer; rotating the signing keys doesn't help. Changing DH moduli more frequently might increase the cost to the attacker, since they can no longer precompute stuff for a fixed modulus, but they can still crack the new one. And there is stuff that is kept classified for decades—I've seen the redactions.
I fully advocate intensive research in PQC. And QC isn’t the only reason to want to ditch crypto now harder than discreet log and factoring problems. But I feel like we are still learning things “too fast” to actually standardize.
The best argument for standardizing I’ve heard is that we are learning things so fast because we are trying to adopt standards.