Notices by Hovav Shacham (hovav@infosec.exchange)

@skinnylatte Cf. kererū! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_rXxRDvLPY

@skinnylatte A Kiwi podcast I've been listening to has ads from the Victoria state government recruiting early childhood educators to relocate!

@brouhaha Vale, perhaps? https://github.com/project-everest/vale

The security hill I will die on: Credit for the “backdoored compiler” trick should go to Karger and Schell (“Multics Security Evaluation: Vulnerability Analysis,” 1974).¹ That’s the “Unknown Air Force Document” from which Thompson (1984) borrowed the idea.
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¹ https://www.acsac.org/2002/papers/classic-multics-orig.pdf, §3.4.5

I guarantee that this is the wildest paper you’ll read all year. Drewes et al., “Pentimento: Data Remanence in Cloud FPGAs,” https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.17881

We find that a remote attacker can recover “FPGA pentimentos” — long-removed secret data belonging to a prior user or proprietary design image on a cloud FPGA. Just as a pentimento of a painting can be exposed via infrared imaging, FPGA pentimentos can be exposed via signal
timing sensors instantiated on a remote cloud FPGA. The sensitive data constituting an FPGA pentimento is imprinted to the device through bias temperature instability effects on the underlying transistors. We demonstrate how this slight degradation can be measured using a time-to-digital converter when an adversary programs one into the target cloud FPGA. This technique allows an attacker to ascertain previously safe information, after it is no longer explicitly present, on cloud FPGAs. Notably, it can allow an attacker to (1) extract proprietary details or keys from an encrypted FPGA design image available on the AWS marketplace and (2) recover information from a previous user of a cloud-FPGA. Both threat models are experimentally validated on the AWS F1 platform.