Corrupted build environments can deliver compromised cryptographically
signed binaries. Several exploits in in critical supply chains have
been demonstrated in recent years, proving that this is not just
theoretical. The most well secured build environments are still single
points of failure when they fail.
In 1984, Ken Thompson presented "Reflections on trusting trust" which
described an attack on a build toolchain that would be impossible to
detect through source code review ... in the decades since, what has
been done to actually mitigate these types of attacks?
Work in the Reproducible Builds and Bootstrappable Builds communities
has been progressing steadily in recent years, and can be used to
significantly reduce the risks of "Trusting Trust" and other supply
chain attacks, by making it possible to independently review not only
the end result, but the entire toolchain used to build a given
artifact.
This talk will focus on the state of the art from several angles in
related Free and Open Source Software projects, what works, current
challenges and future plans for building trustworthy toolchains you do
not need to trust.
https://reproducible-builds.org
https://bootstrappable.orgSpeaker:
Vagrant Cascadian
Janneke
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