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   Micah Lee (micahflee@infosec.exchange)'s status on Sunday, 04-May-2025 05:36:15 JST Micah Lee

   I wrote up a detailed analysis of TM SGNL, the unofficial Signal app that senior Trump fascists use to organize their war crimes https://micahflee.com/tm-sgnl-the-obscure-unofficial-signal-app-mike-waltz-uses-to-text-with-trump-officials/

   • Ryan Castellucci (they/them) :nonbinary_flag:, Rich Felker, Tim Chambers and Kim Scheinberg repeated this.
   • Embed this notice
     Micah Lee (micahflee@infosec.exchange)'s status on Sunday, 04-May-2025 05:36:15 JST Micah Lee

     in reply to

     The source code for the TM SGNL apps (basically a backdoored version of Signal used by Trump officials) is public! Since it's open source, I've pushed it to github for easier research https://micahflee.com/heres-the-source-code-for-the-unofficial-signal-app-used-by-trump-officials/

     iOS code: https://github.com/micahflee/TM-SGNL-iOS

     Android code: https://github.com/micahflee/TM-SGNL-Android

   • Embed this notice
     Rich Felker (dalias@hachyderm.io)'s status on Sunday, 04-May-2025 05:55:06 JST Rich Felker

     in reply to

     @micahflee LMAO, they weren't just using Signal to plan war crimes, but using a shitty amateur-hour backdoored Israeli fork of Signal to plan war crimes?? 🤦

     Haelwenn /элвэн/ :triskell: likes this.
   • Embed this notice
     Rich Felker (dalias@hachyderm.io)'s status on Sunday, 04-May-2025 06:19:11 JST Rich Felker

     in reply to

     • Phosphenes

     @Phosphenes @micahflee I haven't analyzed it but presumably the Israeli company that made the fork has some capacity for access to the phones running it. Folks reading it can probably fill in more details. We have the full development history available to look at.

   • Embed this notice
     Micah Lee (micahflee@infosec.exchange)'s status on Sunday, 04-May-2025 06:19:12 JST Micah Lee

     in reply to

     • Rich Felker

     @dalias yup, well said

   • Embed this notice
     Phosphenes (phosphenes@mastodon.social)'s status on Sunday, 04-May-2025 06:19:12 JST Phosphenes

     in reply to

     • Rich Felker

     @micahflee @dalias

     For us non infosec folks, a back door means it's more leaky/less secure than regular Signal?

     That the Israelis or whoever can spy on your communication, even if you didn't invite reporters from The Atlantic?

   • Embed this notice
     lj·rk (ljrk@todon.eu)'s status on Sunday, 04-May-2025 11:20:29 JST lj·rk

     in reply to

     @micahflee Found the source!

     It's linked under the `/developer` path for API libraries, and they explicitly mention GPL so they're probably not in violation of licenses:
     https://www.telemessage.com/developer/api-libraries/

     ----

     Some other info/links which you may or may not know already/or could be helpful:

     This is their Play Store listing, including their Telegram capture but not Signal:
     https://play.google.com/store/apps/developer?id=TeleMessage

     This is linked from: https://www.telemessage.com/downloadapp/

     There's also the WebApp (which first tries to auth via SSL Cert but fallbacks to mail / user-password): https://webchat.telemessage.com/

     And the secure.-Subdomain with login window: https://secure.telemessage.com/

     This FAQ lists other subdomains and ports:
     https://www.telemessage.com/what-firewall-ports-must-be-opened-to-enable-enterprise-number-archiver-voice-call-wifi-usage/

     The REST-API described there can also be interfaced through their Java or PHP SDK:
     https://github.com/TeleMessage/