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1. Embed this notice
   Nathan Schneider (ntnsndr@social.coop)'s status on Wednesday, 11-Dec-2024 13:04:19 JST Nathan Schneider

   If you don't want AI spying on your phone, there are options besides continually disabling it. One great one is, next time you need a new device, get one with e/OS. Android minus the spying. https://murena.com/america/products/smartphones/?wcpbc-manual-country=US

   • Embed this notice
     Nathan Schneider (ntnsndr@social.coop)'s status on Thursday, 12-Dec-2024 05:46:44 JST Nathan Schneider

     in reply to

     • GrapheneOS
     • fid02

     @Tidbit @GrapheneOS Thanks—I just added a note to the OP encouraging folks to see these critiques.

   • Embed this notice
     fid02 (tidbit@infosec.exchange)'s status on Thursday, 12-Dec-2024 05:46:45 JST fid02

     in reply to

     • GrapheneOS

     @GrapheneOS I think you meant to write eOS, not iOS.

   • Embed this notice
     GrapheneOS (grapheneos@grapheneos.social)'s status on Thursday, 12-Dec-2024 05:46:46 JST GrapheneOS

     in reply to

     • Jorge Saturno :niboe:

     @jorge @ntnsndr

     iOS does not have basic exploit protections and security features intact. They do not properly sign their releases, do not use have a secure update system, do not use verified boot, etc. They aren't taking privacy or security seriously at all. Industry standard security features are missing or even outright disabled. The starting point of LineageOS is where many of these issues come from, but it's a further step down from there for security.

   • Embed this notice
     GrapheneOS (grapheneos@grapheneos.social)'s status on Thursday, 12-Dec-2024 05:46:48 JST GrapheneOS

     in reply to

     • Jorge Saturno :niboe:

     @jorge @ntnsndr

     iPhones provide better privacy and security than /e/OS including for their services which largely support end-to-end encryption with the Advanced Data Protection feature for iCloud.

     /e/OS has far worse privacy from apps than iOS. With /e/OS, you cannot give apps access only to certain contacts or certain media/storage if they insist on demanding access to all of it. There are a bunch of other unaddressed privacy weaknesses, especially due to the older Android version.

   • Embed this notice
     GrapheneOS (grapheneos@grapheneos.social)'s status on Thursday, 12-Dec-2024 05:46:49 JST GrapheneOS

     in reply to

     • Jorge Saturno :niboe:

     @jorge @ntnsndr

     The eylenburg comparison has a useful comparison of how some of the default Android Open Source Project connections to Google services and GNSS vendors are handled. That's not a full list of default connections and most of the operating systems including /e/OS add a bunch of additional connections, many of them problematic themselves.

     Aside from that, moving to a different set of privacy invasive services without end-to-end encryption doesn't really protect people's privacy.

   • Embed this notice
     GrapheneOS (grapheneos@grapheneos.social)'s status on Thursday, 12-Dec-2024 05:46:50 JST GrapheneOS

     in reply to

     • Jorge Saturno :niboe:

     @jorge @ntnsndr

     Compatibility with Android apps is also much different. GrapheneOS provides our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer:

     https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/113459782313987260

     Can run nearly all Play Store apps on GrapheneOS, but not /e/OS with the far more limited and less secure microG approach.

     https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm is a third party comparison between different alternate mobile operating systems. It could include many more privacy/security features but it's a good starting point.

   • Embed this notice
     GrapheneOS (grapheneos@grapheneos.social)'s status on Thursday, 12-Dec-2024 05:46:51 JST GrapheneOS

     in reply to

     • Jorge Saturno :niboe:

     @jorge @ntnsndr

     GrapheneOS and /e/OS are very different. GrapheneOS is a hardened OS with substantial privacy/security improvements:

     https://grapheneos.org/features

     /e/OS is not a hardened OS.

     They're always on a very old release with partial support. Android 15 QPR1 is needed for full privacy/security patches. Only patches for issues deemed High/Critical priority are backported to older Android releases, and most privacy patches are not backported.

     They also lose a bunch of security features.

   • Embed this notice
     Jorge Saturno :niboe: (jorge@red.niboe.info)'s status on Thursday, 12-Dec-2024 05:46:53 JST Jorge Saturno :niboe:

     in reply to

     • GrapheneOS

     @ntnsndr another great option is to get a Pixel phone and install @GrapheneOS on it using WebUSB installer, quite a straightforward installation process.

   • Embed this notice
     Nathan Schneider (ntnsndr@social.coop)'s status on Thursday, 12-Dec-2024 05:55:33 JST Nathan Schneider

     in reply to

     • Gaël Duval - /e/OS & Murena
     • murena
     • GrapheneOS

     @GrapheneOS Any responses, @murena @gael

   • Embed this notice
     GrapheneOS (grapheneos@grapheneos.social)'s status on Thursday, 12-Dec-2024 05:55:35 JST GrapheneOS

     in reply to

     @ntnsndr /e/OS is Android with a massive reduction in security and their own privacy invasive, non-end-to-end encrypted services instead of Google services. iPhones provide far better privacy and security than Murena devices. These lack basic industry standard exploits mitigations and other security features, still integrate Google services with privileged access and do not take privacy/security seriously at all. Not having Google Play isn't enough for privacy.

     https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/113634784870168085