Notices by GrapheneOS (grapheneos@grapheneos.social)

Our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer is open source code shipped as part of GrapheneOS which enables optionally installing and running Google apps as regular apps in the standard app sandbox without any special access, control or privileged integration into the OS.

FUTO apps aren't open source but rather source available with heavy restrictions on usage:

https://github.com/futo-org/android-keyboard/blob/master/LICENSE.md

They're taking the place of real open source apps and making it less likely for viable options to emerge since people are going to use and contribute to these.

FUTO made a $40k donation to GrapheneOS supposedly with no strings attached. They ended up being unhappy with us not making content with them and promoting them. They began supporting attacks on us and tried to destroy the GrapheneOS project. Recommend not taking money from them.

GmsCompatConfig is the text-based configuration for the GrapheneOS sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer. It provides a large portion of the compatibility shims and sets the maximum supported versions for Play services and the Play Store.

GmsCompatConfig version 147 released:

https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/releases/tag/config-147

See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.

Forum discussion thread:

https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/17102-gmscompatconfig-version-147-released

#GrapheneOS #privacy #security #gmscompat

@unity https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm is a third party comparison between different alternate mobile operating systems. It could include many more privacy/security features but it's a good starting point.

https://privsec.dev/posts/android/choosing-your-android-based-operating-system/ is an article with more long form comparisons between OSes.

@unity Compatibility with Android apps is also much different. GrapheneOS provides our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer:

https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play

Can run vast majority of Play Store apps on GrapheneOS, but not /e/OS with the far more limited and less secure microG approach.

@unity /e/OS has egregiously bad security. It doesn't preserve the basics of the Android security model or provide proper patches. It's filled with fake privacy features and their own privacy invasive apps/services.

GrapheneOS and /e/OS are very different. GrapheneOS is a hardened OS with substantial privacy/security improvements:

https://grapheneos.org/features

/e/OS is not a hardened OS. It greatly reduces security vs. AOSP via added attack surface, weakened security model and slow patches.

@unity These claims do not have an actual technical basis and are false marketing to promote insecure products. This is not how we want GrapheneOS to be promoted.

Cybernews is a tabloid publishing endless misinformation. It shouldn't be used as a source. We debunked one of their recent egregiously inaccurate articles here:

https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/16338-highly-misleading-and-inaccurate-article-from-cybernews-about-the-pixel-9/

/e/OS themselves are charlatans spreading misinformation and misleading people. They're doing exactly that here with false and misleading claims.

GrapheneOS based on Android 15 will reach the Stable channel later today. It's very stable already and we've fixed a bunch of upstream bugs including several impacting the stock Pixel OS. We've made 7 official releases based on 15 already and the 8th is going to reach Stable.

9th generation Pixels with Android 15 including those running the stock OS have a serious bug in Pixel Camera Services that's breaking apps using the CameraX Night extension. This issue isn't specific to GrapheneOS and isn't going to block the release of Android 15 GrapheneOS.

@condret @Hyolobrika

We need to fix several different forms of leaks in the Android VPN system. Adding a major new feature with an improper design and leaks is the opposite of what we want.

We have to choose what to prioritize and how to design the features we include. We were responding to someone that's proposing we choose our priorities and how to design features based on opening up a voting system to everyone.

Why should people who aren't experts or doing any work decide on what to do?

@condret @Hyolobrika

Rejecting a badly designed privacy feature which is done in an anti-privacy way and unnecessarily ties devices together is the opposite of theater. In GrapheneOS, we care a lot about implementing things correctly and not misleading users about what's provided. We want to provide a better form of this feature than what people are asking for but it's very difficult to provide a good feature within the way app-based VPNs work on Android. We're busy fixing upstream leaks.

@alxlg It's not about politics and is a technical matter. We linked to an article about the encryption being broken due to their design approach to the cryptography not following best practices. They continued not following best practices and cryptographers still have the consensus that multiple of the design choices are weaknesses which can and should have been avoided. Cryptography falls apart very easily from tiny errors. Why not read the article we linked in the 4th post?

@winfried @L3p0 Having potentially untrustworthy people in the chat who might leak it is a much different thing from mass surveillance of all chats being trivial.

@kkarhan @signalapp @delta PGP is legacy technology with tons of legacy cryptography like still using SHA-1 for fingerprints in practice. It doesn't have forward secrecy like a proper secure messaging system. The main implementation of it that's widely used is horribly implemented with massive security flaws throughout it (GPG). The web of trust nonsense is badly designed and always in use even to simply verify a specific file with a specific key from a file. Keyservers are another big mess.

@kkarhan @signalapp @delta Most of your claims here are horribly wrong and you're giving lots of bad advice. You're claiming things are scams which aren't and are posting inaccurate claims and misrepresentations about Signal and other things.

@kkarhan @signalapp @zulip @delta @monocles @gajim

You're spreading blatant misinformation about Signal and are recommending people use non-private messaging systems without end-to-end encryption among your recommendations...

@doerk Many people do, look at the angry replies to the same thread on X including harassment directed at our team because of it which is not something we expected. Russian military and special forces uses both for operational communications including coordinating artillery strikes, etc...

A major example of how Telegram's opt-in secret chat encryption has gone seriously wrong before: https://words.filippo.io/dispatches/telegram-ecdh/.

The practical near term threat is for the vast majority of chats without end-to-end encryption: 100% of Telegram group chats and the regular 1-to-1 chats.