In his essay “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” written long before this archeological evidence was available, American sociologist conjectured essentially the same thing.
In the wake of the fall of the Roman Empire in Western Europe, we saw bands of mounted warriors attach themselves to settler agrarian communities and offer their services for “protection” in a manner identical to what we’re familiar with from the Mafia today.
These early modern states were rudimentary but recognizable as states: they had elite authorities who set rules, monopolized violence, and extracted resources. But they faced a problem: neighboring states wanted to expand into their territory, and they wanted to expand into their neighbors’ territory, to grow richer. So they fought wars. Lots of wars.
But war is enormously expensive, from feed for horses to blacksmiths for armor to merchants to provide food on campaign. So these early states were forced to seek ever more elaborate mechanisms for extracting resources to provision armies in the field to fight wars to expand territory.
In this way, these rudimentary states incrementally expanded their purview, seeking new sources of revenue. In return, they frequently had to make concessions to sub-state actors (usually the ones with their own fiscal resources), bringing merchants and bankers and landlords into the structure of the state itself.
They expanded taxation. This required more administrators, to survey and catalogue assets. They expanded conscription. This required a census and last names to catalogue people. They borrowed lots and lots of money. This created public finance and public debt.
Step by step, the rudimentary mafioso state became the modern administrative state, not because something fundamental had changed about the state but to get better at taking and hurting.
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https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seeing_Like_a_State