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   Neko McCatface v2023 :verified::makemeneko: (roboneko@bae.st)'s status on Tuesday, 15-Aug-2023 13:58:15 JST Neko McCatface v2023 :verified::makemeneko:

   in reply to

   • Ako Suminoe :njp:
   • Ulysses
   • :niggy:
   @RealAkoSuminoe @niggy @professionalbigot69 just to make the point explicit. consider that if you manage to convince either of those companies to sign a payload for you then you have god mode on any of their processors that recognize that key. it's really quite dangerous tech to have built in the first place
   • Alex Gleason likes this.
   • Embed this notice
     :niggy: (niggy@poa.st)'s status on Tuesday, 15-Aug-2023 13:58:16 JST :niggy:

     in reply to

     • Ulysses
     @professionalbigot69 feds backdooring everything like that is mostly a myth, NSA doesn't need to get backdoors from vendors when they can just buy exploits from L3Harris, easier and less risk
     mostly a myth, I think there's been a couple of public cases over the decades
   • Embed this notice
     Ako Suminoe :njp: (realakosuminoe@poa.st)'s status on Tuesday, 15-Aug-2023 13:58:16 JST Ako Suminoe :njp:

     in reply to

     • Ulysses
     • :niggy:
     @niggy @professionalbigot69 I was under the impression that backdoors would come from the Intel Management Engine or AMD's equivalent, rather than by backdooring the encryption algs or operating systems themselves.
   • Embed this notice
     Ulysses (professionalbigot69@poa.st)'s status on Tuesday, 15-Aug-2023 13:58:17 JST Ulysses
     thought the FCC would be against the NSA requiring backdoors on most networking equipment being sold stateside (national security risk and whatnot)