> The war has come to Rublevka. Putin's elite estates are in the midst of a drone attack. Federal TV barely reports on the attack. Federal TV channels are reporting almost nothing about the largest drone attack on the capital and the near future since the start of the war, MO noticed. "Russia-24" focuses on the fact that buildings were slightly damaged and that all drones were "suppressed". The TV channels have not interrupted their broadcasts for special news bulletins and there is no special plaque on Rossiya-24's airtime saying "urgent" - as usually happens during emergency events.
> This was probably a psychological attack, and in places populated by Putin's elite. In Moscow, these are prestigious south-western neighbourhoods. In Moscow, the Rublevskoye Highway and its environs, where Putin's cronies live.
* One of the drones fell in the village of Ilyinskoe, just 3 kilometres from President Putin's residence in Novo-Ogarevo. * In the village of Znamenskoye is the estate of Putin's friend Gennady Timchenko. Next door is the Gorki-9 residence of Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and the house of Kirill Shamalov, the president's former son-in-law. Nearby live the father of the governor of Moscow Region, Senator Yury Vorobiev, and Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu. * The mansions of Putin's closest friends Arkady and Boris Rotenberg stand opposite each other in the village of Zhukovka in the Ilyinskoe Pole. And next door is the house of Shoigu's mistress Elena Shebunova. In the Landscape settlement, Sergei Kirienko has a house. Igor Sechin has a house in Barvikha. The former Mikoyan dacha is owned by Viktor Zolotov, head of the Federal Guard Service. * In Arkhangelskoye, the home of Valery Zorkin, head of the Constitutional Court, who the other day brought Putin a map of Europe with Ukraine absent there (which later turned out to be present). * The "princes" also live in the same places: Igor Sechin's children Inga and Ivan (in Barvikha), Zolotov's son-in-law Yuri Chechikhin and Zolotov's son Roman (in Rechnoye). * The drone was on its way to Vlasikha, the central command post of the Strategic Missile Forces.
There's some interesting opinions from Russian publicists but all of them are anti-Putin folks. Likely reason for this partial bias is that pro-Putin sources have nothing novel to say at this moment, likely politely waiting for the official narrative they are expected to repeat 🤷♂️
Here's journalist Anatoly Nesmyan presenting his interpretation of today's attack:
> It seems that the main motive of Russian propaganda will be: "yes almost no damage done, nothing to worry about". > Generally speaking, the goal here is definitely not damage. The objective of such an event is a cognitive shift. > You were persuaded by Simonyan: "What's there to bother with, come on, Ukraine?!" It turned out that this worthless Ukraine is quite capable of reaching Moscow. You have been told that we are waging a holy war against NATO. But if you cannot be protected from the half-baked mockery of the Third World, will you be protected from the serious means of the real NATO? The question is rhetorical. You were guaranteed security in exchange for the total surrender of your freedom - well, where is that security? > Clearly these are very difficult questions for that part of the people who are the regular audience of the Rossiya channel and Channel One news. But they are no longer the majority. And they may well start questioning the mismatch between the picture on television and the one outside the window. There are not many clinical idiots among them either. > Material damage is a tenth issue here.
Especially note this paragraph:
> You were guaranteed security in exchange for the total surrender of your freedom - well, where is that security?
It seems to be one of the best summaries of the implied social contract in Russia I've seen so far.
One of the largest challenges in any political dispute with Moscow has been traditionally its overwhelming arrogance and feeling of impunity. This is what allowed them to blatantly deny any involvement in Salisbury, Crimea, MH17, Bucha etc in spite of hard evidence - their unsaid answer was always like “yes, we know we’re lying and we know you know but what are you going to do?” Seems like Ukraine decided they’re going to put a price on this tactics of theirs.
As for the Western reactions, I recently watched a very relevant interview with Yigal Levin[^1] who said, commenting on the Belgorod incursion, that it’s very much in the interest of Ukraine to take the war to the enemy’s territory. He argues, if Ukraine is the only party suffering losses to its people and infrastructure, then of course Russia can continue it for years. He also said this was always very much Israel’s policy in response to much larger hostile countries that surround it, and it was exactly how demilitarisaion of Sinai was achieved after 1982, effectively ensuring long-term peace. Levin also said that in such as huge disproportion between Israel and its enemies, both in terms of human resources and military objectives (Israel - survival, everyone else - eradication of Israel and Jews), Israels’ allies are ready to tolerate - not praise, approve, encourage but specifically tolerate - some tactics they would not approve of in a more balanced armed conflict.
At this point, I still have very fresh memories of the war in Chechnya, which was of course also asymmetrical conflict, but at some point Chechen leadership quite openly approved of indiscriminate violence against Russian civilians (kidnappings, beheadings, bombings etc). I intuitively very much understand there’s a clear boundary between an UAV flying into Kremlin or Rublyovka and Chechen airplane bombing 2000’s style but I must admit the boundary is more vague than a clear “no attacks on Russian soil” policy before.
On the other hand, Russian society and elites don’t seem to be any more unnerved about the war in Ukraine than they were in 2022 and the state propaganda is impermeable, so maybe this is the factor that resulted in change of tactics.
This is a good indication that it is no false flag. The elite is not well like and if it would have succeeded the average bloke would probably cheer for it.
So either UKR (or related group) with a good choice of popular targets. Which seems most likely.
Or Z-radicals starting a quarrel with the regime (somewhat in line with some Prigozhin statements). Which is unlikely, since they might have other means at hand. But UkR should put the blame on them anyhow.