At Boeing’s encouragement, and as part of a deregulatory agenda of his second term as president, George W. Bush turned this regulation over to the airplane manufacturers. Boeing would now hire safety monitors, and they would report to Boeing, and these monitors would ght the FAA when the FAA sought changes before certifying an airplane to y. The results of this power transfer are evident in the Boeing Max case on multiple levels. First, the head of aviation safety at the FAA at the time of these accidents, Ali Bahrami, was a former lobbyist for Boeing. And before the accidents, Bahrami successfully lobbied from inside the FAA to give Boeing more control, and the FAA less control, of approving the design of new airplanes. Moreover, when Boeing tested MCAS using ight simulators, pilots reported back to their employer that the system was buggy. Boeing didn’t report that to FAA regulators. The company also removed all mentions of MCAS from pilot manuals, a decision that the FAA supported.
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