Embed Notice

HTML Code

<blockquote style="position: relative; padding-left: 55px;"><section><a href="https://chaos.social/users/delta/statuses/114167475011104101">Delta Chat (delta@chaos.social)'s status on Sunday, 16-Mar-2025 06:47:46 JST</a><a href="https://chaos.social/@delta" title="delta@chaos.social"><img src="https://gnusocial.jp/avatar/71458-48-20241223090541.webp" width="48" height="48" alt="Delta Chat" style="position: absolute; left: 0; top: 0;">Delta Chat</a><div><a href="https://fedi.arutaz.se/objects/ae9880ea-85f5-47d5-856b-191add1b97a0" rel="in-reply-to">in reply to</a><ul><li></ul></div></section><article><p><a href="https://fedi.arutaz.se/users/arutaz">@arutaz</a> at he upcoming openpgp summit in April post quantum cryptography will be a topic. ... See also <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-pqc/" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-pqc/</a> which is close to finalization ... So sooner or delta will grow support for pqc but it's, frankly, a bit overrated. There are many more immediate threats to care for like  blocking and censorship attacks.  Because what good is a service, however cool.cryptographically, if it can not be actually used?</p></article><footer><a rel="bookmark" href="https://gnusocial.jp/conversation/4738181#notice-9279932">In conversation</a><time datetime="2025-03-16T06:47:46+09:00" title="Sunday, 16-Mar-2025 06:47:46 JST">about 2 months ago</time> <span>from <span><a href="https://chaos.social/@delta/114167475011104101" rel="external" title="Sent from chaos.social via ActivityPub">chaos.social</a></span></span><a href="https://chaos.social/@delta/114167475011104101">permalink</a><h4>Attachments</h4><ol><li><article><header><div>Domain not in remote thumbnail source whitelist: static.ietf.org</div><h5><a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-pqc/">Post-Quantum Cryptography in OpenPGP</a></h5><div> from <span>Aron Wussler</span></div></header><div>This document defines a post-quantum public-key algorithm extension for the OpenPGP protocol. Given the generally assumed threat of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer, this extension provides a basis for long-term secure OpenPGP signatures and ciphertexts. Specifically, it defines composite public-key encryption based on ML- KEM (formerly CRYSTALS-Kyber), composite public-key signatures based on ML-DSA (formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium), both in combination with elliptic curve cryptography, and SLH-DSA (formerly SPHINCS+) as a standalone public key signature scheme.</div><footer></footer></article></li></ol></footer></blockquote>

Corresponding Notice

Embed this notice
Delta Chat (delta@chaos.social)'s status on Sunday, 16-Mar-2025 06:47:46 JSTDelta Chat
in reply to
- arutaz
@arutaz at he upcoming openpgp summit in April post quantum cryptography will be a topic. ... See also https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-pqc/ which is close to finalization ... So sooner or delta will grow support for pqc but it's, frankly, a bit overrated. There are many more immediate threats to care for like blocking and censorship attacks. Because what good is a service, however cool.cryptographically, if it can not be actually used?
In conversation2 months ago from chaos.socialpermalink
Attachments
1. Domain not in remote thumbnail source whitelist: static.ietf.org
  Post-Quantum Cryptography in OpenPGP
  from Aron Wussler
  This document defines a post-quantum public-key algorithm extension for the OpenPGP protocol. Given the generally assumed threat of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer, this extension provides a basis for long-term secure OpenPGP signatures and ciphertexts. Specifically, it defines composite public-key encryption based on ML- KEM (formerly CRYSTALS-Kyber), composite public-key signatures based on ML-DSA (formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium), both in combination with elliptic curve cryptography, and SLH-DSA (formerly SPHINCS+) as a standalone public key signature scheme.

Public

Embed Notice

HTML Code

Corresponding Notice