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<blockquote style="position: relative; padding-left: 55px;"><section><a href="https://hachyderm.io/users/molly0xfff/statuses/113744579566126058">Molly White (molly0xfff@hachyderm.io)'s status on Tuesday, 31-Dec-2024 09:22:32 JST</a><a href="https://hachyderm.io/@molly0xfff" title="molly0xfff@hachyderm.io"><img src="https://gnusocial.jp/avatar/34789-48-20230824095227.webp" width="48" height="48" alt="Molly White" style="position: absolute; left: 0; top: 0;">Molly White</a><div><a href="https://hachyderm.io/@molly0xfff/113744571615013751" rel="in-reply-to">in reply to</a></div></section><article><p>The roughly thirty FTX adversary cases, filed against business partners, customers, effective altruist organizations, and political action committees, pull back the curtain on how cryptocurrency companies do business.</p><p><a href="https://hachyderm.io/tags/crypto" rel="tag">#crypto</a> <a href="https://hachyderm.io/tags/cryptocurrency" rel="tag">#cryptocurrency</a> <a href="https://hachyderm.io/tags/FTX" rel="tag">#FTX</a></p></article><footer><a rel="bookmark" href="https://gnusocial.jp/conversation/4284613#notice-8375627">In conversation</a><time datetime="2024-12-31T09:22:32+09:00" title="Tuesday, 31-Dec-2024 09:22:32 JST">about 19 days ago</time> <span>from <span><a href="https://hachyderm.io/@molly0xfff/113744579566126058" rel="external" title="Sent from hachyderm.io via ActivityPub">hachyderm.io</a></span></span><a href="https://hachyderm.io/@molly0xfff/113744579566126058">permalink</a><h4>Attachments</h4><ol><li><label><a rel="external" href="https://gnusocial.jp/attachment/3810175">Over a year after Sam Bankman-Fried’s trial, perhaps one of the most memorable moments to stick with me was an unexpected one: a brief exchange between prosecutors and BlockFi founder Zac Prince. (FTX’s collapse bankrupted the crypto lender, which had loaned FTX entities hundreds of millions.)BlockFi's Zac Prince: [With] crypto firms, it was much less common to have audited balance sheets because of issues with getting audits as a cryptocurrency firm.Prosecutor: Just to be clear, some of the balance sheets you received from crypto firms were what is called unaudited balance sheets.Prince: I would say the majority of balance sheets that we received from cryptocurrency firms were unaudited.
This casual statement about lending hundreds of millions based on scrawled estimates and a “trust me, bro” underscored the deception in crypto executives’ post-collapse claims that FTX was a rare bad actor with aberrant business practices, a black sheep among scores of legitimate businesses. On the contrary, many of FTX’s activities were business as usual in an industry where regulatory enforcement and proper audits were rare, but maximal leverage and risk-taking were par for the course.</a></label><br><a href="https://media.hachyderm.io/media_attachments/files/113/744/574/990/186/498/original/3c2cf74d1b220eaa.png" rel="external">https://media.hachyderm.io/media_attachments/files/113/744/574/990/186/498/original/3c2cf74d1b220eaa.png</a></li><li><label><a rel="external" href="https://gnusocial.jp/attachment/3810176">I’m not so much fascinated by the specifics of the FTX adversary cases two years post-bankruptcy, where the debtors work to claw back the remaining traces of FTX’s exorbitant spending. Instead, I’m interested in the pulling back of the curtain on the cryptocurrency industry’s day-to-day operations. Shady practices have become so commonplace as to be open secrets, only questioned during occasional brushes with those from more strictly regulated financial sectors — who often react with horror when given a peek at the crypto industry’s standard operating procedure.In the span of only a few days in November 2024, the FTX bankruptcy estate filed over thirty adversary cases.1 Several target political action committees and non-profits that received hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars from FTX as part of the company’s political influence campaigns and reputation polishing efforts. Others target other cryptocurrency exchanges where Alameda Research or affiliated entities were trading — sometimes secretly — and where account balances haven’t been released back to the bankruptcy estate. Some target FTX customers engaged in criminal behavior. And some target employees, contractors, or business associates of FTX and its entities.</a></label><br><a href="https://media.hachyderm.io/media_attachments/files/113/744/574/998/208/525/original/9c5a2c3253eadf0f.png" rel="external">https://media.hachyderm.io/media_attachments/files/113/744/574/998/208/525/original/9c5a2c3253eadf0f.png</a></li></ol></footer></blockquote>

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Molly White (molly0xfff@hachyderm.io)'s status on Tuesday, 31-Dec-2024 09:22:32 JST Molly White
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The roughly thirty FTX adversary cases, filed against business partners, customers, effective altruist organizations, and political action committees, pull back the curtain on how cryptocurrency companies do business.
#crypto #cryptocurrency #FTX
In conversationabout 19 days ago from hachyderm.iopermalink
Attachments
1. Over a year after Sam Bankman-Fried’s trial, perhaps one of the most memorable moments to stick with me was an unexpected one: a brief exchange between prosecutors and BlockFi founder Zac Prince. (FTX’s collapse bankrupted the crypto lender, which had loaned FTX entities hundreds of millions.) BlockFi's Zac Prince: [With] crypto firms, it was much less common to have audited balance sheets because of issues with getting audits as a cryptocurrency firm. Prosecutor: Just to be clear, some of the balance sheets you received from crypto firms were what is called unaudited balance sheets. Prince: I would say the majority of balance sheets that we received from cryptocurrency firms were unaudited. This casual statement about lending hundreds of millions based on scrawled estimates and a “trust me, bro” underscored the deception in crypto executives’ post-collapse claims that FTX was a rare bad actor with aberrant business practices, a black sheep among scores of legitimate businesses. On the contrary, many of FTX’s activities were business as usual in an industry where regulatory enforcement and proper audits were rare, but maximal leverage and risk-taking were par for the course.
  https://media.hachyderm.io/media_attachments/files/113/744/574/990/186/498/original/3c2cf74d1b220eaa.png
2. I’m not so much fascinated by the specifics of the FTX adversary cases two years post-bankruptcy, where the debtors work to claw back the remaining traces of FTX’s exorbitant spending. Instead, I’m interested in the pulling back of the curtain on the cryptocurrency industry’s day-to-day operations. Shady practices have become so commonplace as to be open secrets, only questioned during occasional brushes with those from more strictly regulated financial sectors — who often react with horror when given a peek at the crypto industry’s standard operating procedure. In the span of only a few days in November 2024, the FTX bankruptcy estate filed over thirty adversary cases.1 Several target political action committees and non-profits that received hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars from FTX as part of the company’s political influence campaigns and reputation polishing efforts. Others target other cryptocurrency exchanges where Alameda Research or affiliated entities were trading — sometimes secretly — and where account balances haven’t been released back to the bankruptcy estate. Some target FTX customers engaged in criminal behavior. And some target employees, contractors, or business associates of FTX and its entities.
  https://media.hachyderm.io/media_attachments/files/113/744/574/998/208/525/original/9c5a2c3253eadf0f.png

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