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<blockquote style="position: relative; padding-left: 55px;"><section><a href="https://mastodon.social/users/heidilifeldman/statuses/112711859345209621">Heidi Li Feldman (heidilifeldman@mastodon.social)'s status on Tuesday, 02-Jul-2024 00:56:01 JST</a><a href="https://mastodon.social/@heidilifeldman" title="heidilifeldman@mastodon.social"><img src="https://gnusocial.jp/avatar/14479-48-20241117035723.webp" width="48" height="48" alt="Heidi Li Feldman" style="position: absolute; left: 0; top: 0;">Heidi Li Feldman</a><div><a href="https://mastodon.social/@heidilifeldman/112711798039962584" rel="in-reply-to">in reply to</a></div></section><article><p>Screenshot of a lengthy passage from <a href="https://mastodon.social/tags/Sotomayor" rel="tag">#Sotomayor</a> dissent in <a href="https://mastodon.social/tags/Trump" rel="tag">#Trump</a> immunity case. In short: despite stating a difference between official and unofficial (private) acts, the Court’s treatment of official acts eviscerates the force of the supposed distinction. 5/</p></article><footer><a rel="bookmark" href="https://gnusocial.jp/conversation/3316730#notice-6534912">In conversation</a><time datetime="2024-07-02T00:56:01+09:00" title="Tuesday, 02-Jul-2024 00:56:01 JST">about 5 months ago</time> <span>from <span><a href="https://mastodon.social/@heidilifeldman/112711859345209621" rel="external" title="Sent from mastodon.social via ActivityPub">mastodon.social</a></span></span><a href="https://mastodon.social/@heidilifeldman/112711859345209621">permalink</a><h4>Attachments</h4><ol><li><label><a rel="external" href="https://gnusocial.jp/attachment/2854237">In fact, the majority's dividing line between "official" and
"unofficial" conduct narrows the conduct considered "unof-ficial" almost to a nullity. It says that whenever the President acts in a way that is "not manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority," he is taking official action. Ante, at 17 (quoting Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC
2023)). It then goes a step further: "In dividing official from unofticial conduct, courts may not inquire into the President's motives." Ante, at 18. It is one thing to say that motive is irrelevant to questions regarding the scope of civil liability, but it is quite another to make it irrelevant to questions regarding criminal liability. Under that rule, any use of official power for any purpose, even the most corrupt purpose indicated by objective evidence of the most corrupt motives and intent, remains official and immune. Under the majority's test, if it can be called a test, the category of Presidential action that can be deemed "unofficial" is destined to be vanishingly small.
Ultimately, the majority pays lip service to the idea that
"[t]he President, charged with enforcing federal criminal laws, is not above them," ante, at 13-14, but it then proceeds to place former Presidents beyond the reach of the federal criminal laws for any abuse of official power.</a></label><br><a href="https://files.mastodon.social/media_attachments/files/112/711/852/812/605/143/original/00ea82dd7ca7bc94.jpeg" rel="external">https://files.mastodon.social/media_attachments/files/112/711/852/812/605/143/original/00ea82dd7ca7bc94.jpeg</a></li></ol></footer></blockquote>

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Heidi Li Feldman (heidilifeldman@mastodon.social)'s status on Tuesday, 02-Jul-2024 00:56:01 JST Heidi Li Feldman
in reply to
Screenshot of a lengthy passage from #Sotomayor dissent in #Trump immunity case. In short: despite stating a difference between official and unofficial (private) acts, the Court’s treatment of official acts eviscerates the force of the supposed distinction. 5/
In conversationabout 5 months ago from mastodon.socialpermalink
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1. In fact, the majority's dividing line between "official" and "unofficial" conduct narrows the conduct considered "unof-ficial" almost to a nullity. It says that whenever the President acts in a way that is "not manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority," he is taking official action. Ante, at 17 (quoting Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC 2023)). It then goes a step further: "In dividing official from unofticial conduct, courts may not inquire into the President's motives." Ante, at 18. It is one thing to say that motive is irrelevant to questions regarding the scope of civil liability, but it is quite another to make it irrelevant to questions regarding criminal liability. Under that rule, any use of official power for any purpose, even the most corrupt purpose indicated by objective evidence of the most corrupt motives and intent, remains official and immune. Under the majority's test, if it can be called a test, the category of Presidential action that can be deemed "unofficial" is destined to be vanishingly small. Ultimately, the majority pays lip service to the idea that "[t]he President, charged with enforcing federal criminal laws, is not above them," ante, at 13-14, but it then proceeds to place former Presidents beyond the reach of the federal criminal laws for any abuse of official power.
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