looks like you're disputing the claim that the signature checking is, on most machines, implemented in software recorded in the bootable media. is this so? you got any supporting evidence for that? is that verifiable by the average voter? by the parties? by international observers?
still, your response is quite informative, in that you mention yourself a quite disastrous attack scenario: compromising TSE's signing key. it's odd that you put it this way, because AFAIK the signing keys that should matter are not TSE's, but those of the various public-interest organizations that participate in the ceremonial compilation and anti-tampering signing of the binaries. in either case, compromising the keys would lead to disastrous behavior. how can the average voter verify that the keys have not been compromised? how can the parties? how can international observers? can anyone? or have you just confirmed it is indeed blind faith and propaganda, while trying to deny it?