@eltrac @loke @cheeaun What does faking commit authorship actually buy an attacker?
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Soatok Dreamseeker (soatok@furry.engineer)'s status on Thursday, 30-Apr-2026 00:17:55 JST
Soatok Dreamseeker
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Soatok Dreamseeker (soatok@furry.engineer)'s status on Thursday, 30-Apr-2026 00:27:01 JST
Soatok Dreamseeker
@loke @eltrac @cheeaun Your suspicion is incorrect. I'm trying to make sure I understand the shape of the problem you're trying to solve.
You're tying commit authenticity to long-lived keys. You're stapling non-repudiation into your designs. You're assuming a lot of security properties about the cryptography algorithms involved.
For example: Signatures do not, by themselves, provide a property called exclusive ownership. https://www.bolet.org/~pornin/2005-acns-pornin+stern.pdf
Many of these properties matter significantly in some use cases. I was probing to see if they mattered here.
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Elias Mårtenson (loke@functional.cafe)'s status on Thursday, 30-Apr-2026 00:27:02 JST
Elias Mårtenson
@soatok @eltrac @cheeaun it's reasonably easy to think of various scenarios. But I suspect that whatever I say, the reply will be "that's not a real problem" or "there are other ways to protect against that".
Suffice it to say that I'm not worried about specific scenarios that I can envision. It's the ones that may happen in the future I'm concerned about. Proving the chain of changes is what I think itbis is just a good idea. Especially since my primary project uses SHA1 hashes.
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Soatok Dreamseeker (soatok@furry.engineer)'s status on Thursday, 30-Apr-2026 00:31:13 JST
Soatok Dreamseeker
@loke @eltrac @cheeaun If you're using SSH signatures with Ed25519 (very common), you have Universal Exclusive Ownership by design.
If you're using anything else, it's a "maybe". Most PGP keys I've seen, historically, were RSA keys.
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