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1. Embed this notice
   Soatok Dreamseeker (soatok@furry.engineer)'s status on Thursday, 19-Feb-2026 11:04:25 JST Soatok Dreamseeker

   RE: https://furry.engineer/@soatok/116088639302283341

   So, Matrix responded with a blog post.

   I added an addendum to mine to rebut theirs: https://soatok.blog/2026/02/17/cryptographic-issues-in-matrixs-rust-library-vodozemac/#matrix-response

   • Embed this notice
     Garbage Data 🦝 (anomalocarididae@furry.engineer)'s status on Thursday, 19-Feb-2026 11:11:41 JST Garbage Data 🦝

     in reply to

     @vavsvirtual hey you you wanted to read this article right? well now there's more

   • Embed this notice
     LogicalErzor (logical_error@fosstodon.org)'s status on Saturday, 21-Feb-2026 00:21:21 JST LogicalErzor

     in reply to

     @soatok im still a little confused how the identity element is a problem

     let’s say i have a group chat with friends:
     - one friend uses a client that sets identity element to 0 (whether purposefully setting it or downloading a malicious client unaware it’s disguised as an encrypted client)
     - anyone sniffing the traffic between us can trivially decrypt the messages?

     do i have that right?

   • Embed this notice
     Soatok Dreamseeker (soatok@furry.engineer)'s status on Saturday, 21-Feb-2026 00:21:21 JST Soatok Dreamseeker

     in reply to

     • LogicalErzor

     @Logical_Error Yes, assuming they can observe the ciphertext.

     If Matrix is deployed with well-configured TLS, this means probably only the homeserver is in a position to do this. If Matrix isn't, it's free real estate for QUANTUMINSERT and other attacks.

     You and your friends will be "using" encryption, believing that your messages are private, while not having any real confidentiality.

     This is a cryptographic protocol failure that results in silently losing confidentiality without warning. In the context of cryptographic attacks, the severity is pretty high.

     Could the users also just give their private key to an adversary? Yes, but that requires an out-of-band signal. This compromises privacy without any external leak.