@c0dec0dec0de @hipsterelectron The solution is not prompting for trust. The solution is not making an automated dependency fetching system that requires trust.
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Rich Felker (dalias@hachyderm.io)'s status on Thursday, 05-Jun-2025 20:09:28 JST
Rich Felker
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0xC0DEC0DE07E8 (c0dec0dec0de@hachyderm.io)'s status on Thursday, 05-Jun-2025 20:26:06 JST
0xC0DEC0DE07E8
@dalias @hipsterelectron yeah, cargo chaining out into the horizon and saying, “all the light touches, you must *directly* trust” is no way to do things.
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Rich Felker (dalias@hachyderm.io)'s status on Thursday, 05-Jun-2025 21:59:17 JST
Rich Felker
@c0dec0dec0de @hipsterelectron Hot take that shouldn't be:
If you're automatically fetching build dependencies in any way not controlled by the user or an agent they've designated, the only acceptable behavior is:
(1) matching exact verifiable hashes for versions vetted by the authors of the dependent software, not version inequalities, and
(2) ensuring that no code from those deps is run with with any access to the build host (so, either no code at all, or code in a language without host bindings or properly sandboxed).
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