Right now there are a lot of new eyes on Signal, and not all of them are familiar with secure messaging and its nuances. Which means there’s misinfo flying around that might drive people away from Signal and private communications. 1/
One piece of misinfo we need to address is the claim that there are ‘vulnerabilities’ in Signal. This isn’t accurate. Reporting on a Pentagon advisory memo appears to be at the heart of the misunderstanding: https://npr.org/2025/03/25/nx-s1-5339801/pentagon-email-signal-vulnerability. The memo used the term ‘vulnerability’ in relation to Signal—but it had nothing to do with Signal’s core tech. It was warning against phishing scams targeting Signal users. 2/
In order to help protect people from falling victim to sophisticated phishing attacks, Signal introduced new user flows and in-app warnings. This work has been completed for some time and is unrelated to any current events. If you’re interested in learning more, this WIRED article from February 19th (over a month ago) goes into more detail: https://wired.com/story/russia-signal-qr-code-phishing-attack/ 4/
Phishing isn’t new, and it’s not a flaw in our encryption or any of Signal’s underlying technology. Phishing attacks are a constant threat for popular apps and websites. 3/
How else would they be able to support that infrastructure?
I wouldn't recommend using the official Signal App if you do use it. Molly is open source and has an F-Droid repository that allows for easier updates if you don't use any Google Services.
He’s calling it a "commercial app”. He claims intelligence services are able to attack if they want (somewhat credible I guess), and then proposes Threema as a better alternative, because the servers are in Switzerland (which sounds irrelevant to me in the context of e2ee without metadata).
@signalapp Signal is good. the only requirement I know of to be successful on Signal is do not be a shit-eating dipshit nazi who is so dumb as to add professional whistleblowers to your illegal federal defense communications/gossip chat.
@signalapp IMO now is a more important time for Signal to emphasis the use of usernames v's phone numbers as a way to add and trust recipients. Similar to to the trust model of @threemaapp or #wire