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It would appear as if Wiz may have discovered another supply-chain compromise:

https://www.wiz.io/blog/new-github-action-supply-chain-attack-reviewdog-action-setup

The attack involved compromising the v1 tag of reviewdog/action-setup between March 11th 18:42 and 20:31 UTC. Unlike the tj-actions attack that used curl to retrieve a payload, this attack directly inserted a base64-encoded malicious payload into the install.sh file. When executed, the code dumped CI runner memory containing workflow secrets, which were then visible in logs as double-encoded base64 strings. The attack chain appears to have started with the compromise of reviewdog/action-setup, which was then used to compromise the tj-actions-bot Personal Access Token (PAT), ultimately leading to the compromise of tj-actions/changed-files. Organizations are advised to check for affected repositories using GitHub queries, examine workflow logs for evidence of compromise, rotate any leaked secrets, and implement preventive measures like pinning actions to specific commit hashes rather than version tags.

#CyberSecurity #SupplyChain