Much of what is commonly said about #email and #openpgp is wrong. It can very well be fast and secure and that's a claim backed by working code and deployments and audits (#chatmail servers and the #deltachat family of apps). There is no both-sides-have-opinions game to be played here. Internet-scale messaging alternatives are arguably either centralized or brittle. There is however much room for further improvements including deep changes in how we commonly understand email today. Stay tuned :)
@me@unixtippse signal also doesn't have "sealed recipients": When a client sends a message signal server knows precisely who are the recipients including their verified phone numbers.
@unixtippse@delta I'm actually surprised about that. That said, the perfect forward secrecy bit remains. Also, it doesn't do anything to mask who you're communicating with (which is admittedly difficult to do).
@ax3@me we may eventually return to the topic of forward secrecy ... it is doable but details matter which we won't discuss much here. Please do note that up until today, nobody has come up with federated PFS protocols in real life messengers that would be as reliable as Signal. For now, PFS means centralization and that's a very high price to pay.
@me@delta perfect forward secrecy while nice to have, i think will depend on your threat-model. if someone has a hold of my device it's already over and i have bigger problems.
the metadata i feel is threat-model specific. i'm okay with someone knowing my deltachat email is bld3jjasdjjhf@rando.server.today it's still somewhat of an abstraction