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   :pdx_elk: (rose@503junk.house)'s status on Wednesday, 20-Nov-2024 09:15:02 JST :pdx_elk:

   I keep seeing opsec posts about how to secure your phone to stop cops from checking it. These mitigations will never do a great job of protecting you from a state level threat (they may from stalkers, thieves, and domestic violence threats).

   If you are worried about state level actors getting information from you, it should not touch your phone.

   • Håkan Geijer repeated this.
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     :pdx_elk: (rose@503junk.house)'s status on Wednesday, 20-Nov-2024 09:15:02 JST :pdx_elk:

     in reply to

     If a fascist state is trying to get copies of your messages, then maybe you and the person you sent messages with don't have fingerprint access on. OK. But then what happens when they tell the person you were messaging with that they will waterboard them if they don't unlock their phone?

     Conversations about how far people will go and how much people will resist is a waste of time, imo. You should never put someone in a position where they could be tortured to get access to messages like that.

     Don't boast. Don't get edgy. If you don't want something to come up in court through discovery, don't ever store it.

     That's actual opsec. Everything else is mitigations to lower risk a bit and/or just security theater.