@GossiTheDog@alex -- I don't think this was from: Spraying M365 Mailbox accounts... Reading between those lines, "Non-Prod-Test-Tenant Account" That sounds a whole lot more like a 'Service Account/Machine Account" used for a Proof of concept tool/service; automation accounts aren't going to have MFA.
There are a great many different services/tools that are granted delegated access to various different things, email being accessed sounds to me that perhaps it was an automation service meant to trigger actions based on access to mail content/interaction.
Microsoft made a catalogue of errors in how they configured and secured their Microsoft 365 tenants. It is not a Microsoft product defect issue; the directly sell the governance products and services to stop this kind of thing.
@GossiTheDog One note.. the article mentions a small number of accounts but then it says this: "Midnight Blizzard’s use of residential proxies to obfuscate connections makes traditional indicators of compromise (IOC)-based detection infeasible due to the high changeover rate of IP addresses." So they saw failed logins from a large number of IP addresses for a small number of users and they didnt think to investigate that?
Not mentioned in the blog - to grant Oauth access to read all mailboxes (as happened here), you need to be the tenant admin. There's not a vuln being used here, as Microsoft would have mentioned it for sure - so somebody made a pretty big config error in production to allow a test tenant app to be used to grant *checks notes* reading of any mailbox.
@GossiTheDog If that is true then my question would be how did the actor determine what accounts to spray? info leaking? If they were focusing on a handful of accounts they must have already known which ones had the golden ticket.
Threat actors like Midnight Blizzard compromise user accounts to create, modify, and grant high permissions to OAuth applications that they can misuse to hide malicious activity. The misuse of OAuth also enables threat actors to maintain access to applications, even if they lose access to the initially compromised account. Midnight Blizzard leveraged their initial access to identify and compromise a LEGACY TEST OAUTH APPLICATION THAT HAD ELEVATED ACCESS TO THE MICROSOFT CORPORATE ENVIRONMENT. The actor created additional malicious OAuth applications. They created a new user account to grant consent in the Microsoft corporate environment to the actor controlled malicious OAuth applications. THE THREAT ACTOR THEN USED THE LEGACY TEST OAUTH APPLICATION TO GRANT THEM THE OFFICE 365 EXCHANGE ONLINE FULL_ACCESS_AS_APP ROLE, WHICH ALLOWS ACCESS TO MAILBOXES."
Or does being the tenant admin go beyond the above? If it does, can you or someone explain how?
I found this image floating around on that wretched bird site. Am I interpreting it wrong or does it indicate there's a way to allow non-admins to read all inboxes? If not, can you show me an appropriate screenshot? (No need for the screenshot if too much of a hassle. Just an answer will suffice.)
Washington Post say more than 10 more companies (so far) have been caught in the Microsoft 365 Exchange Online data breach situation and are expected to disclose publicly. https://wapo.st/47Qi3yC
Worth noting - there’s no evidence the breach of Microsoft’s Microsoft 365 Exchange Online tenant is the cause of the wave of breaches of Microsoft’s customers Microsoft 365 Exchange Online tenants. (Try saying that ten times).
What I mean by that is Microsoft misconfigured their corporate setup.. and their customers have other similar issues, based on evidence so far.
Oauth and AD app permissions are an absolute clusterfuck and the defaults and AppCompat probably need reviewing at MS end.
It’s not just that use case. Smart attackers are not thinking in graphs, they’re living off Microsoft Graph. You can avoid alerting. It’s not just Russia.
@GossiTheDog@alex How are people just now coming to the conclusion that the company that sells burning buildings shouldnt also sell 20oz bottles of water?
@GossiTheDog I heard an argument at a conference that implied that Azure and the services that run on top of it haven't been shut down by threat actors because of how useful it is to them. So essentially the only reason it still exists is because its so insecure.
Got fancy Microsoft E5 licensing? Prepare to keep paying more and more as basic product features arrive and get placed into new premium offerings as SMB's drown.. as Microsoft have got to keep profits top right.
- Reality is everything is way too complex - lots of MS things ship in risky configurations - nobody (including Microsoft) can figure out how to scale securing it - everything is way too expensive
Microsoft’s two biggest commercial security risks are ransomware groups, and /itself/.
They've gone from saying attackers think in graphs to getting attackers to live on the Microsoft Graph, which has allowed them to monetise their cloud security failures.
@GossiTheDog this stuff has gotten out of hand. Capitalism is great, but at what overall expense.
I hate bureaucratic regulations, but it seems like some form of regulation is needed here.
I mean come on, would you buy a car today where it costs extra for bumpers, seatbelts, and airbags? This wouldn’t even be permitted. They’re standard safety requirements.
I think we need some form of minimum “safety” requirements to keep us all safer online.
@GossiTheDog the overlapping products and massive web of complexity is really a big issue. We thought we were enforcing MFA but weren't because we didn't check on box in a sub menu under a different product that we're not even licensed for.
Something I think lost in the M365 thing - I think it's a great blog on technical indicators, and MS should be applauded for disclosing.
But also, recent changes in regulation at the SEC forced disclosure in the first place.
This isn't Microsoft's first rodeo - it's just one of the few times you get to know about it.
MS will probably go through a few years of pain with repeat public incidents like this, but ultimately they will be healthier for it - and so will their customers as a result.
Update on the Microsoft 365 hack - Russia has used the exfiltrated data to push further into Microsoft’s network: “In recent weeks, we have seen evidence that Midnight Blizzard is using information initially exfiltrated from our corporate email systems to gain, or attempt to gain, unauthorized access. This has included access to some of the company’s source code repositories and internal systems.”
An important bit: “Some of these secrets were shared between customers and Microsoft in email, and as we discover them in our exfiltrated email, we have been and are reaching out to these customers to assist them in taking mitigating measures.” #threatintel
The US Federal government is apparently impacted by the Russian hack of Microsoft 365 Exchange Online (not to be confused with the Chinese hack of Microsoft 365 currently in the headlines). CISA has held private briefings. https://cyberscoop.com/federal-government-russian-breach-microsoft/
Microsoft and CISA now say that the Russian data breach of Microsoft 365 a few months ago against MS cyber staff emails also resulted in the theft of US Federal Agency emails.