THREAD by ming zhao re china's economy:
https://twitter.com/FabiusMercurius/status/1440411706543407110
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1440411706543407110.html
https://twitter.com/INArteCarloDoss/status/1439992995638546434
THREAD by ming zhao re china's economy:
https://twitter.com/FabiusMercurius/status/1440411706543407110
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1440411706543407110.html
https://twitter.com/INArteCarloDoss/status/1439992995638546434
Graph (left) shows the asset/liabilities ratio for 10 other propcos besides Evergrande. Note: they're all less than 1, which means shareholder's equity is negative- including Greenland, Sunac, Vanke, Country Garden...
Chart (right) shows the top 15 worst propcos in the world.
6/ What is the CCP gonna do now?
China is incentivized to let Evergrande collapse while minimizing shakeup in the rest of its property market.
So far the CCP made its goals pretty clear: pro stability & deleveraging; anti speculation.
https://twitter.com/INArteCarloDoss/status/1439992995638546434
5/ What about the whole real estate sector?
TLDR: this could snowball fast.
China's top 200 property companies currently hold >$5.5 TRILLION in assets at 8x leverage.
If Evergrande catalyzes even a 15% decline in prices across the board, much of the industry becomes insolvent.
4/ Where does all that bailout money come from?
In America we say "money printer go brr."
In China we say "money printer go BRRRRRRRRRR."
Xi's QE has been making a farce out of JPow since 2008. 👇
Is it sustainable?
3/ Who's next?
It kinda feels like trick-or-treating. Like Chinese financial institutions just gotta stick out their hand and the big brother rushes in with backstop.
Oh, and then there was Huarong.
And don't forget HNA.
HNA was an "airport."
The way Evergrande is a "property company."
... And Bank of Gansu.
In July 2020, a state-backed provincial highway operator stepped in as the largest shareholder, but was dealing with its own balance sheet issues. Months later the company announced a 167.3B¥ refinancing to deal with debts on 37 government toll roads.
2/ China's Other Fantastical Bank Bailouts
Evergrande's story is big. But it's barely new news.
In May 2019 China’s central bank announced its 1st bank takeover in 20 years: Baoshang.
Creditors were to take a hit, assets would be sold and an example set for governance.
And then there was Bank of Jinzhou.
In March 2020, the PBoC poured another 12B¥ into Jinzhou as Tier 1 capital adequacy fell to 5.14%. Two quasi state-controlled investors were said to have seized 44.34% in the troubled lender.
Let's be more explicit.
In June 2019, Evergrande plowed 13.2B¥ into Shengjing Bank, acquiring 36% stake in a literal lender.
Shengjing was on the brink of default. Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio was 8.52%, barely above regulatory req.
Now why would a propco bail out a bank? 🤔
1/ How Evergrande is Actually a (Shadow) Bank
On the surface Evergrande is a propco. It has insatiable demand for capital cuz it needs to buy land. That's what propcos do.
But then Evergrande started stuffing its commercial paper into WMPs & selling it off to its own employees.
Post-Evergrande: China's Waterfall of Pain
China itself is one big Evergrande.
One big debt crisis.
For years massively over-levered shadow banks masqueraded as propcos, got drunk on credit, flirted w/ default & called for bailout like a late-night uber.
Contagion has begun
👇
Most of the data and images from this thread come from @rosetechnology_.
Check them out for more primary source data & visuals as the China debt crisis continues to unfold.
/end/
Beyond Evergrande, China’s Property Market Faces a $5 Trillion Reckoning - WSJ
https://www.wsj.com/articles/beyond-evergrande-chinas-property-market-faces-a-5-trillion-reckoning-11633882048
7/ But is all of this... systemic?
According to macro expert @ABCampbell, "for a credit issue to get systematic, it has to go through the banking system, in particular the biggest and least stable"
Here they are. China's worst banks.
(its "Waterfall of Pain")
Let's wait & see.
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