Captain Chesley Sullenberger explained what went wrong at Boeing in testimony before Congress after the second 737 Max accident. The plane was plagued by designed-in aerodynamic and automation failures that made the accidents inevitable. But Boeing told a human error story—blaming the accidents on the pilots and how they failed in interacting with the automated systems. The 737 Max was a redesign of the old 737. During production and testing, engineers and test pilots discovered that the new design, now more fuel efficient, also made the craft less aerodynamic. Instead of stopping work to remake the plane, Boeing added software, a system known as MCAS. To cover for the plane’s poor maneuverability, the software would sometimes push down the plane’s nose without input from the pilot. If this software failed, Boeing expected the pilot to fix it. **To review: Boeing built a plane that was difficult to fly, then added software that autocorrects these difficulties, but decided that if that software fails, the pilot should save the day by figuring out how to fly the difficult-to-fly plane. **“It has been suggested that even if the MCAS software had flaws, the pilots on these flights should have performed better and been able to solve the sudden unanticipated crises they faced,” Sullenberger told the committee. “Boeing has even said that in designing MCAS they did not categorize a failure of MCAS as critical because they assumed that pilot action would be the ultimate safeguard.”
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