I see some common ingrained misunderstandings around "Incident Reviews" / "Post Mortems" in technical orgs.
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I see some common ingrained misunderstandings around "Incident Reviews" / "Post Mortems" in technical orgs.
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2. "Human error" is _never_ a contributing factor (or "root cause" 🤬). The problem is that until Human 2.0 comes out it is completely unfixable. Humans don't make decisions or take actions in a vacuum. There is _always_ an outdated procedure, bad policy, false belief, missing documentation, poor tooling, or lack of training behind a mistake made by a human. That is something you can fix!
1. There is no single "root cause". IMO this term is harmful because, while it makes for an easily graspable concept, the metaphor encourages identifying a _single_ cause. There is _never_ a single reason behind an incident. Instead there are always several "contributing factors".
> shell escapes are blocked
what does this mean?
Free software and cloud wrangler. Security Engineering dabbler.
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