@horse@tsupasat It's a default part of the OS install from what I understand. I am not aware of a standard Windows desktop/server flavor that ships without it, but I could be mistaken.
A friend of a friend had their Apple ID stolen via social engineering attack. Attacker changed the recovery email/phone number associated so the owner is completely locked out. Person is able to show purchase history proving account ownership but Apple is telling them to pound sand. 🤦
Anybody dealt with something similar and know how to get Apple to care enough to assist?
Ok, I was tired of rumors speculating about which #LastPass fields appear to be encrypted client-side before being sent to LastPass, so I ran some tests of my own.
For a basic "Password" item, here is what I can tell so far.
When saving the item, the following primary fields are transmitted encrypted:
Name
Extra (Notes field)
Username
Password
TOTP (not in this screenshot, but did test)
However, I also observed the following fields having a cleartext (hex) version in the payload as well:
Name
Username
URL
Folder Name (not hex)
So in other words, there is more than just the URL being transmitted to LastPass in the clear, which makes sense because LastPass' Admin console reveals login activity for all users which includes Name, Username, and URL of the login event; so naturally, these things must be transmitted and kept server-side outside of the vault. However, this once again does go against their "zero-knowledge of anything in your vault" marketing...
Screenshots of this test below. I have omitted the encrypted data to prevent revealing enough for a "Known Plaintext Attack" to derive a key, but the relevant pieces are visible.